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Abstract—Network traffic analytics technology is a cornerstone
for cyber security systems. We demonstrate its use through
three popular and contemporary cyber security applications
in intrusion detection, malware analysis and botnet detection.
However, automated traffic analytics faces the challenges raised
by big traffic data. In terms of big data’s three characteristics
— volume, variety and velocity, we review three state of the
art techniques to mitigate the key challenges including real-time
traffic classification, unknown traffic classification, and efficiency
of classifiers. The new techniques using statistical features,
unknown discovery and correlation analytics show promising
potentials to deal with big traffic data. Readers are encouraged
to devote to improving the performance and practicability of
automatic traffic analytic in cyber security.
Index Terms—Cyber Security, Big Data, Network Traffic
Classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS an increasingly huge amount of important informationabout users are delivered and stored on the Internet,
cyber security becomes a primary concern. Protecting network
from various attacks is the paramount task, where traffic data
analysis is a key technology [1]. Moreover, traffic classification
applying data analytics significantly improves the effectiveness
and efficiency of the process, as well as enables us to detect
abnormal traffic patterns.
Some popular applications of cyber security involved with
traffic data analysis include intrusion detection, malware anal-
ysis and botnet detection. The automatic techniques based on
machine learning algorithms are proposed for these applica-
tions. To be specific, intrusion detection system can catch the
abnormal traffic including peer-to-peer (P2P) malicious traffic,
denial-of-service (DoS) attack traffic and spams; malware can
steal user information and cause harms to users. In addition,
mobile malware spread widely [2]. To detect such traffics,
malware behaviors are analyzed and this knowledge promotes
traffic classification in identifying the corresponding malware
[2]; botnets consist of many Internet hosts controlled and
manipulated by botmakers via the infection of malware [3]. As
for this bot detection, the list of command and control (C&C)
domain is used as a reference among bots identification. As a
fundamental technique among these attack detections, traffic
classification is applied widely in recognizing various network
traffic and singling out the abnormal traffic.
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Fig. 1. Traffic analytics for cyber security
Considering the massive data existed in network traffic,
the primary problem of traffic classification is raised by big
data which can be illustrated with three characteristics —
volume, variety, and velocity [4], [2]. Traffic classification is
facing three key challenges, which respectively corresponds
to real-time classification, unknown traffic classification, and
the efficiency of automatic classification. In terms of real-time
classification, statistical-based classification is more suitable
than the port-based and payload-based approaches. Statistical-
based classification considers the flow traffic as the unit object
in analysis, whilst the other two methods build the classifier
analyzing the packet information [1]. As for the unknown
traffic problem, both supervised learning and unsupervised
learning cannot solve the problem alone [5]. Therefore, Zhang
et al. [5] proposed a robust network traffic classification
with the combination of unsupervised learning and supervised
learning to resolve this problem. Lastly correlation technique
is often used to improve the classification performance [6], [7].
In summary, the core concepts mentioned above is depicted
in Figure 1 with the relationship among data sources, core
technologies and cyber security challenges.
II. CYBER SECURITY APPLICATIONS WITH TRAFFIC
ANALYTICS
Most cyber security systems rely on the deep understanding
of network traffic characteristics. In this section, we illustrate
three typical applications of cyber security involving traffic
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2analytics including intrusion detection, malware analysis, and
botnet detection.
A. Intrusion detection
An intrusion detection system (IDS) aims at recognizing
malicious traffic from normal traffic. To achieve this goal, IDS
scans current traffic before rerouting. Because of the hetero-
geneous nature of the attacks, the malicious traffic is often
embedded in botnet traffic, DoS attack traffic, spam traffic, and
so on. The accuracy of detecting such malicious traffic is often
low. In general, the target information of inspecting traffic
includes IP addresses, ports, and payload data. By analyzing
the information, abnormal traffic data can be discovered by
an IDS. Then traffic classification is applied to separate these
abnormal traffic among existing traffic. Accordingly, alerts will
be sent by the IDS.
We use an example to show how traffic analytics is used in
intrusion detection. Ling et al. [8] developed TorWard as an
intrusion detection system for Tor. Tor is the overlay network
often used by attackers deploying botnet C&C servers and/or
sending spams because Tor encrypts the traffic and protects
the attacker’s privacy. Specifically, Tor enforces source routing
by choosing several Tor routers to establish an anonymous
route along with the selected Tor routers. There is an exit
router where all the routes pass through in the end. This exit
router can be considered as a “proxy" and contacts with the
destination directly. In order to protect the network system
through blocking possible harmful traffic, IP address and
opened port can be configured in Tor manually according to
specified policies. Unfortunately, It is a hard job for most
Tor router administrators to know everything and everyone
in the Tor network. Therefore, TorWard is proposed by Ling
et al. [8] as an automated detection system in processing Tor
intrusion discovery, classification and reaction. The outbound
traffic of Tor can be captured at the exit router. Before the
traffic rerouted into Tor, an IDS is positioned on the NAT
gateway. Ling et al. revised the Tor source code and maintain
rules of firewall dynamically in order to except the hinder from
non-Tor traffic.
Additionally, Ling et al. [8] found that nearly 10% Tor traffic
are alerted by IDS because of its malicious traffic generated by
botnet, DoS attack traffic, spams, and so on. Moreover, they
also designed a defense function to limit the usage of Tor by
blocking intrusion traffic. Such an IDS checks the suspected
source IP and ports, and if this traffic instance is classified as
intrusion, then the tear-down command is expected to be sent
to the Tor exit routers. And with extensive rule setting, IDS
can block numerous intrusion traffic. Furthermore, a signaling-
based method named dual-tone multi-frequency is suggested
by Ling et al. [8] to search the correlated botnet traffic from
exit routers. They analyzed the intrusion traffic in Tor and
summarized a category with possible IP of C&C servers,
well-known malware traffic, doubtful DNS query, spams and
suspicious IRC traffic. Specific traffic classification methods
are used on two types of signature-based IDS — Suricata and
Snort [8]. Suricata is configured to store alert messages in
binary format, and Snort employs Unix domain sockets. Tor
traffic can be generally grouped as two traffic types: inbound
and outbound. Because the characteristic of inbound traffic
sets captured by IDS transmitting between endpoints, traffic
classification technique equipped with classifying encrypted
data is needed. With a powerful traffic classification, IDS
can be effective and reliable for automatically detecting the
potential malicious traffic.
B. Malware analysis
The number and the level of technological sophistication
of malicious software are increasing remarkably, as a con-
sequence of the outstanding involvement of smartphone tech-
nologies. Thus, malware analysis is an important task in cyber
security. Alerts reported by malware detection system related
to malicious traffic include unclassified, misc-attack, Trojan-
activity, not-suspicious, and misc-activity [8]. A well-known
example of mobile malware in iOS is XcodeGhost, which
was reported as the reason of numeric user privacy-leakage
in the late 2015, drew the attention of the society and aware
people the importance of cyber security [2]. Xcode is a devel-
opment toolkit for iOS applications. However, XcodeGhost,
a malicious version of Xcode, was uploaded to a Chinese
shared cloud service Baidu cloud. Application developers
downloaded the XcodeGhost without being aware of its danger,
developed the infected applications and published them in
Apple’s App Store. Anyone who downloads and starts those
infected applications in their devices could be a victim to the
privacy-leakage.
Network traffic analytics is an important tool to identify
infected applications in a large scale. Let us see how traffic
analysis is used to study the behavior of XcodeGost. There are
two mainstream methods to study the threat of XcodeGhost,
the first method is from the view of source code of XcodeGhost
to find the detailed information of the malware mechanism,
the other is scanning the source code of iPhone Application
(IPA) packages to detect the infected applications. However,
both methods fail to provide sufficient information about the
XcodeGhost such as the number and ratio of infected devices,
the time and network traffic flow volume characteristics of
XcodeGhost-related HTTP requests and the infected applica-
tions [2]. Combining the fingerprint of applications running
online and its web-knowledge, a novel method was built up
to identify the infected applications instead of scanning the
source code of IPA. This mechanism consists of 5 steps
— 1) extract fingerprints from those applications, 2) collect
web-knowledge by analyzing extracted information, 3) merge
data and identify applications, 4) check those applications
manually, and 5) compare with the identification results.
Massive network traffic were analyzed to gain flow statistical
characteristic of XcodeGhost, which may be useful in grasping
the operating mechanism of XcodeGhost and understanding
other malware like XcodeGhost. To classify HTTP traffic with
specific applications, the characteristics of HTTP headers are
important for analysis, however, the extracted fingerprint infor-
mation is not always clear or complete. The unique identifier
of an application associated with advertisement traffic and
integrated with multiple HTTP requests is needed to extract
3the fingerprint information and identify the full details of an
application.
To fully investigate XcodeGhost, Gui et al. [2] proposed a
novel method by examining the traffic statistical characteristics
of applications. The researchers explored a large volume of
real-world network traffic and found that 930 million out of
1,550 million iPhone devices were infected within 232 days,
which means more than 60% of devices potentially leaked the
privacy information. The results were critical: 842 applications
were identified as XCodeGhost infected by the new proposed
method in traffic network, some of them are famous and popu-
lar applications throughout China like Wechat, railway 12306,
didi taxi, carrot fantasy and so on [2]. The results suggested
that those infected applications send privacy information of
users to a unique web server. Such behavior could not be
detected by using traditional detection methods because the
privacy leaking messages are hidden inside many legitimate
HTTP requests.
C. Botnet detection
Botnets enable attackers to send spams, launch distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS), run brute-force password cracking,
steal private information, and hide the origin of cyber attacks
[3]. Moreover, the malware traffic can be spread rapidly
through this platform. Hence, botnet detection is an important
part in cyber security. According to the structure of botnets,
there are two categories —- P2P botnet and centralized botnet
[8]. In a P2P botnet, the botmaster can control each bot with
distributed commands sent from peers; in a centralized botnet,
the centralized C&C architecture is formed with protocols
like IRC and HTTP. Comparing to the centralized botnet,
P2P botnet is relatively feasible regardless of its complicated
structure and costly management. From the point of view of
user experience, centralized botnet is in extensive usage due
to its simplistic structure, availability of source codes, and
reusable codes.
Network traffic analytics plays an important role in the
discovery and detection of botnets. The typical approach to
detect bots and filter botnet traffic is to maintain a blacklist
of discovered C&C domains. However, the efficiency is poor
because the blacklist is manually updated. Moreover, experi-
enced botmasters often use robust P2P-based C&C structures
with domain generation algorithms to evade the detection by
blacklisting and to increase the reliability of the botnet. That
is, the bots search for working C&C servers by periodically
generating a set of pseudo-random domain names and resolv-
ing the generated domain names to IP addresses through DNS
queries. Therefore, these botnets can still survive even after
some C&C servers are detected and blocked.
Antonakakis et al. [9] show that the random domains
generated by botmasters can be detected by analyzing DNS
traffic. The key idea is that most random domains generated
by domain generation algorithms and queried by the bots
would receive Non-Existent Domain responses. Moreover,
since the bots in the same campaign are using identical
domain generation methods, they are very likely generating
the same set of failed DNS queries. To take advantage of this
Fig. 2. The statistical-based analytics mechanism is presented in this figure.
Flows are used as input of machine learning classifiers, after statistical pro-
cessing is applied to the collected packets. The output shows the categorization
results predicted by machine learning algorithms.
characteristic, Antonakakis et al. propose a traffic analytics
based technique that combines supervised and unsupervised
learning algorithms. The unsupervised algorithm is applied
firstly to separate these random domains into several clusters
according to the similarity of their make-ups of domain names.
Then, supervised learning takes the input of the whole data set
together with some labels of known domains. At last, a new
unknown domain of bot can be detected if no label is assigned
to a cluster.
III. KEY CHALLENGES OF BIG TRAFFIC ANALYTICS
As the previous section revealed, traffic analytics is a
primary foundation for dealing with emerging issues in cyber
security. This section lists the key components of traffic
analytics and the associated challenges in the context of big
data. We elaborate traffic classification in three key facets —
real time, robustness and efficiency corresponding to the three
characteristics of big data featured in terms of volume, variety
and velocity [4].
A. Real time classification by using statistical features
Statistical feature based traffic classification is as useful
as port-based and payload-based classifications. Because the
network traffic data grow exponentially with the rapid de-
ployment of high bandwidth demanding services, the port-
based and payload-based classifications failed to meet the
big data requirements [10], [1], [11]. Specifically, the port-
based classification identifies the applications based on the
port number extracted from the packets according to the IANA
standards [1]. Because the port number can be easily modified
or fabricated, the accuracy of the port-based classification is
too low to fulfill the requirements of cyber security applica-
tions. Conversely, the payload-based classification recognizes
4the protocol signature by inspecting the payload of packets.
Comparing with the port-based method, the payload-based
method produces more accurate results but at a significantly
higher computational cost. The statistical-based classification
balances accuracy and cost by analyzing and extracting statisti-
cal characteristics from trafffic flows generated by applications
without inspecting the contents of individual packets. Because
of this holistic view, the statistical-based classification can be
used to analyze encrypted traffic widely used in Virtual Private
Networks, WiFi, Tor networks and so on.
Machine learning techniques are vital for the statistical-
based traffic classification. The traffic can be processed by
supervised learning, also known as classification, or by unsu-
pervised learning, also known as clustering. Figure 2 depicts
the work flow — the collected packets are firstly grouped
into traffic flows before certain statistical features such as
packet size and arrival time can be obtained and later selected;
the data in the feature space are then fed to the machine
learning algorithm. Due to the nature of network applications,
the training data fed to the machine learning algorithm can
be inbalanced and/or polluted. An inbalanced data set often
consists of non-uniformly distributed packets of different
kinds; and a polluted data set often contains multiple wrongly
labeled samples. The labeled data are used to train the machine
learning algorithms, after a certain amount of time, predictive
models will be built up and used as classifiers or predictors to
classify testing data.
Generally, network traffic contains statistical features such
as packet size, inter-arrival time, flow idle time, distribution of
duration time, and so on, according to Nguyen and Armitage
[1]. These features can be used to successfully differentiate
many Internet applications. If these flow statistical properties
are constructed as inputs, many machine learning algorithms
can handle the classification of real time traffic flow directly
out of the box. For example, naive Bayes and decision tree
can build up a model for classification and prediction. More-
over, k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm is another statistical-based
classification method.
Nevertheless, the statistical-based classification is not per-
fect. There are primarily three limitations. Firstly, it is difficult
and expensive to obtain a balanced training data set with the
uniformly distributed traffic classes from real-world networks.
With an unbalanced data set, the classes with a dominantly
large number of instances are trained more accurately than
the rest. The implication can be problematic when we try
to identify a small portion of malicious packets from a huge
number of normal packets. According to [12], such adversary
information decreases the effectiveness of machine learning
remarkably. Secondly, the statistical data that we collected and
processed as training set might not be representative during
the deployment period. For instance, data collected from
one network may not be applicable else where. Thirdly, the
presence of unknown classes also affects the machine learning
results. An unknown class is a traffic class that existed in the
testing data set but is not included or recognized in the training
data set. Therefore, there could be error in classification as if
a new class data occurs in the testing set.
Fig. 3. The figure reveals the methods towards the challenge of unknown
attacks when processing classification. Mixed training data is used as input
of unknown discovery, which is an initial stage to label known classes,
consequently, the unknown classes are outcropped. Predict the testing data
with classifiers that derived from the clusters, and apply system update stage
if necessary.
B. Robust classification by recognizing unknown classes
Despite of the challenges in real time traffic classifica-
tion, exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities greatly affects
the accuracy of traffic classification [5]. The reason is that
statistical-based traffic classification relies on machine learning
algorithms. These classifiers cannot classify an unknown traffic
which is caused by the exploitation of the zero-day vulnerabili-
ties. To recognize such attacks, our previous work [5] proposed
a Robust network Traffic Classification (RTC) in dealing
with unknown classes that are absent from training data by
integrating supervised and unsupervised learning methods.
There are three processes in constructing RTC including
unknown discovery, classification with unknown class, and
system update.
RTC has powerful classification ability in handling zero-
day traffic’s discrimination together with the traffic that the
classifiers are familiar with. Figure 3 shows the mechanism of
RTC. In the first stage of RTC, unknown traffic are detected
automatically prior to classification. The unlabeled samples
are collected from a specific network obtaining the mixture of
predefined traffic and new traffic. Then a two-step method is
employed in distinguishing zero-day traffic from others. That
is, an unsupervised learning method, k-means, is used to sep-
arate the mixture data into several clusters, while the labeled
training instances help to identify the unknown traffic groups.
And the zero-day class is captured in the unknown clusters
with no or very few labeled instances assigned. Additionally,
there may be more than one unknown application, thus the
second step is to group them into a temporary super set for all
unknown classes. After the processed data are all labeled, RTC
starts the classification stage by applying supervised learning
algorithms with some heuristics to aggregate the prediction
5Fig. 4. The figure presents the mechanism of correlation analysis. Correlation
models are proposed and merged in the machine learning algorithm after the
correlation analysis of the flows. In the unsupervised clustering, the correlation
model is applied as constraints when clustering and helps to improve the
purity of each cluster. As for the supervised classification, application classes
is better predicted after the correlation analysis combined with classification
results.
results.
In order to build an intelligent system with classifying class
in fine-grained level, the traffic classification system should be
updated when necessary. Specifically, the classifier should be
equipped with the knowledge of unknown classes detected in
the first stage instead of putting all unfamiliar traffic into a
general category. In this third stage, k-means is applied again
to cluster the previous data set. Then, several flows of each
cluster are selected and inspected manually. If all the samples
in one cluster are detected as unknown traffic, all flows in this
cluster are acted as training inputs for classifier and a new
class is labeled. After all new classes are found, they will be
appended to previous known class set. Thus, the training data
set is updated, whilst classifiers keep learning more unknown
classes.
Though RTC can recognize unknown classes, there are
still rooms for improvement. In terms of zero-day attacks,
flow correlation technique can be used together with RTC to
increase the accuracy rate. One of the assumptions of RTC
is that the distribution of traffic classes is static, which is not
always true in the real-world networks. In addition, it is also a
problem to accurately and precisely define an unknown class,
especially when there are numerous new classes. Moreover, the
cost of classification significantly increases with the growing
size of training data set, whereas the accuracy rate will
decrease rapidly with an increasing number of classes.
C. Efficient classification by using correlation
Correlation technique is applied in traffic classification to
improve the classification efficiency without incurring too
much processing time. Correlation technique can help us to
identify the traffic with little or minimal prior knowledge.
An example is provided by Ma et al. [6] where correlation
technique combined with the protocol model derived during
the traffic classification. In their work, the correlated infor-
mation of several unlabeled traffic flows is the same protocol
described in their packets according to the same distribution of
one protocol. Since not all flows in one application share one
protocol, their correlation is partially correlated. As a result,
they successfully classified the network flows automatically
with only protocols provided. Another utilization of correlation
information is based on the similar user behaviors [3].
Correlation technique not only can classify traffic data but
also can improve clustering results by increasing each cluster’s
purity. In Wang et al. [7], correlated information are presented
as equivalence set constraints which can reveal the flows
with same protocols in application-layer and sharing for. As
shown in Figure 4, they used the unlabeled statistical features
extracted from the raw packets in unsupervised clustering
with correlation analysis applied in. In other words, the
flow correlation information was used as constraints when
clustering those data and helped increasing the purity of
each clusters. Wang et al. named the integrated method as
Set-Based Constrained K-Means. Herein, the equivalence set
are allocated with 3-tuple heuristics among the five features
described for each flow including source IP address, source
port number, destination IP address, destination port number,
and the protocol. As a result, the classifiers after cluster
identification combined with correlation analysis perform sig-
nificantly better than those ones without correlation applied in
terms of accuracy and computation time.
From Zhang et al. [13], correlation method also makes pos-
itive effects on supervised classification. The specific method
they applied is named as Bag of Flow (BoF), which means
the correlated traffic flows from one application are gener-
ated together as a bag. Specifically, three-tuple heuristic is
considered in a short period of time, that is, destination IP
address, destination port number and the protocol in each
flow traffic. Incorporating with supervised learning method
they used, Nearest Neighbor classifier, several bags instead of
numerous traffic flows are presented as input training data set.
Figure 4 presents that the correlation technique contributes to
their prediction phase, by combining the predicted results that
the trained classifier get and the flow correlation analysis with
vote mechanism. That is, the majority of predicted results for
a set of network traffic data in one same bag, will be the
final classification results of all those data. A probabilistic
framework is built for BoF model to reduce the average
classification error in each bag’s prediction according to the
Bayesian decision theory.
In terms of the challenge of correlation technique, we
can conclude a few points. It still remains an open question
about the way of identifying the new correlation based on
the knowledge of traffic domain. The second problem is on
how to correlate information among traffic data collected from
different sources [3], which the data fusion problem should be
further investigated.
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COMPARISON OF PAPER WORKS RELATED TO ABOVE THREE PARTS
Work
Real-Time Robustness Correlation Traffic Classifier
(volume) (variety) (velocity) (machine learning)
Moore and Zuev [10] Flow statistics based Do not consider Do not consider
Naive Bayes Classifier
(supervised learning)
Handle Zero-day traffic Correlated information: Random forest
Zhang et al. [5] Flow statistics based Unknown discovery 3-tuple heuristic K-means clustering
(applied in BoF) (compound learning)
Product distributions
Ma et al. [6] Payload based Do not consider
Correlated Information: Markov Processes
packet content Common Substring Graphs
(unsupervised learning)
Correlated Information: Equivalence set constraints applied
Wang et al. [7] Flow statistics based Do not consider 3-tuple heuristic with K-Means cluster
(semi-supervised learning)
Correlated Information: Three NN classifiers
Zhang et al. [13] Flow statistics based Do not consider
3-tuple heuristic combined with BoF:
(applied in BoF) AVG-NN, MIN-NN & MVT-NN
(semi-supervised learning)
D. Comparison of Recent Work
As Table I illustrated, among these five key works men-
tioned above, four applied flow statistical-based traffic classi-
fication. Most of works including Zhang et al. [5] and Wang
et al. [7] employed semi-supervised learning among traffic
flow classification to obtain the satisfactory performance. In
addition, the popular correlated information that they found
is 3-tuple heuristics: destination IP, destination port, and
protocol. According to Ma et al. [6], packet contents can
also be considered as correlation based on payload-based
traffic classification. And no matter which the correlation
technique is combined with supervised learning algorithms
[5] or unsupervised learning algorithms [7], they all improved
accuracy rate for traffic classification comparing with using
machining learning algorithm alone. Additionally, to solve the
unknown class problem, the robust traffic classification should
combine with unsupervised learning and supervised learning
with as little manual intervention as possible. Wherein the
unsupervised learning can cluster flows of the same class to
obtain known and unknown classes, and supervised learning
can classify flows with unknown classes labeled manually. It
would be ideal to further reduce the level and the frequency
and intensity of the manual intervention.
IV. DISCUSSION ON FUTURE WORK
Although the state-of-art technologies attain cyber security
to some extend, there are challenges. Such challenges will
require more attention with respect to cyber security problems.
As for the robutness technique, RTC mechanism assumes
that the labeling results that human expert is of high accuracy,
which is problematic due to the availability of the experts and
the unavoidable human errors. Then classifiers are suggested
to be retrained for a long period of time. Therefore, the system
updated is triggered not only when new classes should be
equipped but also when previous known classes are learned
again with new set of data training. And the costs in both
time and money will increase when labors are involved with
examining many unknown classes. To enhance the level of
efficiency of RTC, sub-bag of flow is proposed by Zhang et
al. [5]. Specifically, instead of using only one bag consisting
of correlated flows, several sub-bags are constructed inside of
one bag. And the flows in each sub-bag are collected from the
same user and are sharing with 4-tuple rather than 3-tuple in
BoF by adding an extra protocol-related feature.
In addition, the correlations among flows remain mostly
underused, though some of correlated information had already
identified, like 5-tuple feature among traffic flow including
source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port and
protocol [13]. For example, the attacker’s behavior that is
analyzed and reflected on traffic flow data can be generalized
and classified as a key feature in detecting malicious traffic.
And this key feature can also be regarded as a piece of
correlated information.
The unbalanced data source may affect the accuracy of
the classification results. For instance, the quantity of class
BitTorrent among one collected training data set is over
10,000 which is 1,000 times larger than class RTSP. Hence,
many classifiers can easily extract the characteristics of class
BitTorrent with strong support. Conversely, the 10 RTSP flows
are too few to provide sufficient information for classifiers.
As a result, the accuracy in classification of class RTSP will
be far lower than the accuracy of class BitTorrent performed
by the same classifier. Moreover, since the malicious and
offensive applications almost always maintain minority, the
big data with unbalanced classes structure makes the traffic
classification methods difficult to identify abnormal traffic
with a small amount among massive network traffic. To
significantly improve the performance of classifier, we may
have to introduce a preprocessing step when the portion of
each class can be controlled manually before finalizing training
7data set.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we started with introducing traffic analytics
for cyber security applications from three aspects — intrusion
detection, malware analysis, and botnet detection. In general,
all detection applications employ various traffic classifica-
tion to distinguish the abnormal traffic from other normal
traffics identified from prior knowledge. To enhance the cy-
ber security, some techniques are summarized with detailed
description. Different from two packet-based classifications,
flow statistical-based traffic classification is a new important
tool for current big data analysis. Flow statistical-based traffic
classification not only can tackle the problem of various and
changeable packets, but also is able to handle the encrypted
traffic flow which is popular in use of contemporary and
complex network. Robust network traffic classification can
detect unknown traffic, which is an essential improvement in
cyber security for most malicious traffic is unknown from
current systems. Such detection requires both unsupervised
learning and supervised learning. Thus, the performance of
classifiers can be significantly enhanced by using correlated
information derived from various methods and integrated with
machine learning algorithms. Furthermore, we discussed the
limitations of state of the art techniques and pointed out future
work. All in all, continuous research efforts are needed to
improve automatic traffic analytics and to apply it broadly to
address critical cyber security issues.
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